Wednesday, December 17, 2008

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Concerns of Mr. Carney

In a speech this morning the Governor of the Bank of Canada relied Keynes worrying about what we analyzed down here as a situation of liquidity trap.

Here is the excerpt in question:
".... what Keynes called the "paradox of thrift." It may seem rational at the individual level that individuals want to save more and firms invest less in times of economic uncertainty. However, if this behavior is widespread, it is collectively irrational. Fears of a Recession fueling recession. Similarly, a bank may decide to raise capital in anticipation of increased loan losses during an economic downturn. If all banks do this, they will exacerbate the downturn and increase their potential losses. "

You can read the entire speech here

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The conflicting desires of finance and the deep roots of the current crisis, y 'will be no easy ...

Those who hoped to see the significant drop in the rate of the Bank of Canada will bring down the cost of their mortgages, their student loans or those funding their current consumption were disappointed last week. It was with some indignation mixed with incomprehension that customers of major financial institutions realized that they do not have to follow the central bank. Despite the injection last year of several billion in liquidity into the Canadian banking system, despite the aid package of $ 70 billion announced in the fall by Minister Flaherty, and now, despite the signal by the Bank of Canada is prepared to lower its rate dramatically to support the economy, credit conditions continue to tighten for households and businesses in Canada. What happened?

A liquidity trap
The financial crisis has now become an economic crisis. We are in a recession since the autumn in Canada. This differs greatly from two major recessions of 1981 and 1990 that appeared in the context of a struggle against inflation. Through coordinated action by central banks, a significant increase interest rates had resulted in an economic downturn. The current crisis unfolds in a deflationary environment: the nominal value of financial assets decreased; interest rates are already very low, if not negative, and signs of deflation are beginning to manifest itself in the consumer goods sector. This deflationary drift could loop over itself in a vicious circle of depression as experienced by Japan during the 1990s. This, at least one of the hypotheses put forward by U.S. economist Paul Krugman. This is the trap identified by Keynes as "trap Liquidity, or the desire of everyone to clean up its balance sheet and hold liquid assets contribute to general instability and an overall depressive effect (see article below ).
In such a scenario, all economic actors will engage in a decrease in their activities and especially to postpone their investment plans at the same time they engage in a desperate search for cash. The measures envisaged to date to address the crisis: falling interest rates, loan guarantees, the recapitalization of certain large corporations and financial institutions, are necessary to avoid a complete collapse of the system but can not guarantee a sustainable recovery. The acceleration of public spending in infrastructure can also help avoid the worst, but public investment announced to date are perhaps too shy to break the deflationary / depression. Tax cuts will have an even more insignificant insofar as it is to boost the consumption of those who pay the least, as a reduction in corporate tax not convince them that their markets are fully a sudden expansion.

The deep roots of the crisis
Yet the solutions envisioned, with optimism, Jacques Ménard, Chairman of BMO, in La Presse on November 28 ("A whole day Watch"). Indeed, the crisis was to clean up the balance sheets of households and businesses resulting in increased savings rates. This would ensure that ultimately a recovery in consumption levels experienced during the last two decades. It is important to remember, growth in North America is based primarily on the consumption pattern of households in which we participate alongside our neighbors to the south, central and west. However, Mr Ménard fails in its scenario reflect a reality behind the current crisis. The role of "consumers of last resort" of North American households was constituted in a context of stagnation in real wages, that is to say that the income of the vast majority of workers have not progressed at the same pace of economic growth over the past thirty years. This has, among other things, allowed companies to reap huge profits they have invested in financial markets and kept in liquid form, to the point where, 10 years in Canada and the United States, the sector large enterprises was, until the edge of the crisis, credit instead become globally debtor. Households were able to play their role as guarantor of growth only through an exponential rise in debt. An increase in inflation that their real estate assets has temporarily obscured and that the Securitization by banks of their debts, for some time, given a semblance of viability. Want as requested Mr Ménard they continue to play their economic role of consumer of last resort by requiring them to adopt aggressive practices of savings is deeply contradictory and emphasizes how the substantive issue is taboo. As Keynes pointed 70 years ago, an economy can not grow if it is cleaved by large income inequalities. We'll have to eventually ask the question of wage levels in ordinary households and their income security if you want to restore growth through their consumption and, at the same time, cleaned up their balance sheets and emit a high level of debt.
Rather than engulf our efforts in a liquidity trap, the current crisis should lead us to consider the allocation between corporate profit and wage levels and market mechanisms that drive a wedge between unsustainable revenues stagnant the majority of employees and the explosion of rising income of a minority belongs to Mr Ménard. Because these are, rather than the greed of some and the neglect of others, the factors behind the crisis.

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The liquidity trap: the mechanisms and stages of a deflationary spiral and depression

mechanisms and stages of a deflationary spiral and depression from the scenario liquidity trap


1. We have a fragile international banking system in Canada despite their strong balance sheets. Banks have lost their source of funding was the market for securities backed by assets that allowed them to maintain high credit to businesses and individuals by securitizing. A supply of liquidity in this context only serves to quench the thirst of hoarding financial players wary and vulnerable, without bringing to offer extra credit. (See this )

2. Instead the interbank credit crunch led banks to restrict credit to businesses and households, despite significant decreases and continuous rates of central banks.

3. Firms respond by reducing or postponing their investments, they make layoffs to reduce their production levels. However, the reduction / deferral of some investment translates into lower production / employment of others. In this context, as we will see probably in the case of producers of automobiles, any injection of funding will, as in the banking sector absorbed to hoard rather than to invest or maintain employment.

4. Households lose confidence in the economy, lose income, lose jobs and see a reduction in nominal value of their financial assets and real estate while maintaining that their funding costs. This has several consequences. The most obvious is a likely drop in consumption caused by the loss of confidence which will be added as additional pressure on corporate earnings. This classic loop we know it. By cons, we know little about the multiplier effect of what will have been the restriction on consumer credit growth. And finally, we have no precise idea of the effect on the banking system, rising bankruptcies of households and businesses as well as the progression of late payment of debts that will be generated by the weakening of household incomes. We know that this loop may amplify the credit crunch and banks' thirst for cash.

5. To this we must add the effects of the downturn housing market. Inflation in the value of real estate was used as a lever for credit by households, along with the ease with which banks could securitize their portfolios of mortgages - and thus open new loans - fed the expansion of value of these assets. This positive loop, but actually vicious, between securitization, expansion of the value of real estate and household use of them as leverage for consumption, turns negative loop in which the weight of household debt coupled with the stagnation or decline in value of their homes, has a depressive effect on consumption and weakens the banks holding, beyond the securitization ultimate risk of default.

6. In conclusion, we must add the analysis of these mechanisms and the effect of market dynamics. Unlike the crisis of 1929 or the 1987, stock exchanges, the TSX, the New York Stock Exchange, are not at the forefront of this crisis which originated in the interbank market. Instead, these awards record these developments and amplify. They were strongly shaken by the disappearance of a class of actors structuring: the big investment banks, the slow implosion of values creates a phenomenon that multiplies the effect of the crisis of three interrelated ways. First, households that have significant direct or indirect investments (funds) in stock will see their assets decline in value. The impact of the reverse wealth effect is largely unknown but will be negative. To this we must add the most significant effect of a possible erosion of the basis of capitalization of listed companies, that can not recapitalize if share prices fall too steeply, especially as these movements may thrashing without basic reasons. This can be disastrous for some of them, especially banks, which are currently seeking capital and plans to issue new shares. Finally, the commitments of the major companies to the pension benefit plans are likely to act as an additional burden limiting the expansion of their activities.